US gave up demands in Iran nuclear talks: Journalist

Press TV has conducted an interview with Gareth Porter, an investigative journalist from Washington, to ask for his insight into differences between Iran and the US before Tehran and the P5+1 group reached a nuclear agreement.

The following is a rough transcription of the interview.

Press TV: President Rouhani says that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a victory for Iran's diplomacy. The Obama administration says the outcome of the nuclear negotiations was the result of the successful applications of pressure on Iran through the many economic and financial sanctions to force Iran to agree to cut off all the pathways to a bomb. Who is right about this agreement, do you think?

Porter: Well, I’ve really look into this question of the history of the negotiations between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue. And what has become clear to me is that the United States, the Obama administration and of course the Bush administration before that, really was not interested in negotiating with Iran on the basis of equality as is normally the case in international negotiations.

It was always conceived by President Obama from the beginning of his administration in 2009 as coercive diplomacy meaning that the United States could put enough pressure on Iran to accept the US’ demand that it drop all of its enrichment capabilities, that it end its enrichment program completely. And indeed in 2010, the Obama administration was saying publicly that it was only interested in talking to Iran if it would basically negotiate or talk about the ending of its enrichment program.

So, that’s really the background of the 2013 to 2015 negotiations. And what you find when you really look at the evolution of those negotiations is that the US did in fact give up several major demands during the process including the original demand that Iran actually destroy the facilities in which to enrich uranium every bolt-on screw as the Iranian delegation itself described that demand to me.

And there were other demands of a similar nature that the United States made in the early period of the 2013 negotiations, but which were finally dropped. So, this indeed does turn out to be a diplomatic victory in overall historical terms for Iran. And I would also add specifically in terms of the ballistic missile issue. Of course, the initial UN Security Council resolution did in fact say that Iran’s missiles where they were characterized as delivery systems for nuclear weapons, so that they were categorized as weapon systems that were illicit. And of course, as your intro pointed out the Iranians did win the recognition of the fact that its ballistic missiles were not delivery systems for nuclear weapons and therefore, they made legitimate under the Security Council resolution and the Plan of Action.

Press TV: Alright, now there’s another story that is major concern to Iran. In fact, the IAEA chief is going to brief US senators on this nuclear conclusion. And of course, Iran has warned the IAEA against disclosing confidential texts. To what extent are Iran's concerns justified and what will happen if the IAEA chief chooses to disclose these confidential texts?

Porter: First of all, I don’t think that’s going to happen. I think that the rules are very clear on this in terms of not just the understanding between Iran and the IAEA that is the agreement that they’ve reached, but also the basic principles of operation that the IAEA has been using for many years. My understanding is that although Amano was initially attempted to agree to go talk to the Senate of that he was briefed by his staff on the basic working principles that govern this sort of thing and found that this has never been done and agreed that this should not be done in the present circumstances.

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